Transparency Report Q2 2026

The second quarter of 2026 was used to implement many optimizations on our network and servers. The more efficient everything runs, the more privacy enhancing services we can host. We also published information about our new DNS resolvers and time synchronization servers. In Q3 we will work on new privacy enhancing services we have wanted to add for a long time, but more information about these services will come in the future.

The metrics used in this report are rounded extrapolated snapshots of the final day of the quarter, to not give away too much specific information.

1 Requests & orders

As a provider of pass-through anonymity services, Nothing to hide receives messages about network traffic originating from or destined for our networks on a daily basis. While the vast majority of these messages are general notices send by automated systems, some of them contain legitimate complaints, requests and/or (court) orders/subpoenas directed at Nothing to hide.

Below we report on the quarterly amount of these messages we get from judicial authorities (courts, judges, juries), law enforcement agencies (LEA), business entities and natural persons.

2 Service report

2.1 Tor relays

Traffic on the Tor network can fluctuate quite a bit and the below metrics are merely snapshots of a day around the end of the quarter.

Note that for these statistics both incoming and outgoing advertised bandwidth are combined (just like Tor network’s metrics).

2.2 DNS requests

DNS requests on the Tor network are resolved by the Tor exit relays. This means that high capacity Tor exit relays can generate a lot of DNS queries. These queries are resolved by the same high capacity DNS recursors we offer to the public.

Do note that we don’t log the contents of DNS queries.

2.3 Time synchronization

Time synchronizations can fluctuate quite a bit and the below metrics are merely snapshots of a day around the end of the quarter.

Do note that we don’t log the contents of time synchronization requests.

2.4 Tor diversity

One of our major goals is to break the GNU/Linux monoculture currently present on the Tor network. Monocultures in nature are dangerous, as vulnerabilities are held in common across a broad spectrum. In a globally used anonymity network, monocultures can be disastrous.

We make the Tor network stronger and more resilient by running all our relays on FreeBSD. Here we report on our ongoing effort to increase operating system diversity on the Tor network. If any Tor operator reading this is interested in running Tor relays on BSD, please contact us and we will gladly help out.

Because of the network migration, our next-generation servers and many more Tor relays, our Tor traffic and consensus weight has grown considerably in 2026. Our guard relay consensus weight increased by almost 6 percentage points while our exit consensus weight doubled by an increase of around 12 percentage points.

Add to this that a few other Tor operators have added more guard relays on FreeBSD, and Linux’s consensus weight decreased by more than 5 percentage points for guard relays and by more than 10 percentage points for exit relays as a result.

2.5 DoS attacks

Aside from the occasional DoS attack, it’s relatively quiet in terms of attacks.